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Two of the most significant events affecting the pricing and
marketing of milk produced for fluid use occurred when Congress passed
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, and subsequently the Agricultural Agreements Act of 1937, which authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to issue Federal milk orders.
The first orders were issued in 1936, and by 1947 there were 29
orders in force.

They increased in number to a maximum of 83 in 1962,

and then gradual l y decreased to 47 by 1978, primarily as a result of
mergers.

The amount of milk marketed under Federal orders has increased

over time and amounted to about $8.4 billion in 1978.

This included two

thirds of the value of all farm milk in the U.S., and 79 percent of the
value of all milk produced for fluid use.

Most Grade A milk not regulated

under Federal milk orders is regulated under state orders. Manufacturing
grade milk is not regulated under Federal or state milk orders.
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Idaho Grade A producer milk is marketed regularly in three Federal
order markets - the Inland Empire in the North, the Oregon-Washington on
the West, and the Great Basin in the Southeast.

A hearing was held in

Boise in December 1978 to consider a proposal to put milk marketing
Southwestern Idaho and Eastern Oregon under a Federal order.

The USDA

in its recommended decision ruled against an order at this time.
Federal milk orders were first authorized and issued during the
depression of the 1930s following periods of chaotic prices and marketing
conditions caused in part by the perishable nature of milk, seasonal
imbalances in the supply and demand for milk, and the relatively weak
bargaining position of producers versus handlers.
The objectives of Federal orders are to (a) assist farmers in
developing steady, dependable markets by providing prices for their milk
which are reasonable in relation to economic conditions, and (b) assure
consumers at all times of adequate supplies of pure and wholesome milk [lJ.
They operate to correct conditions of price instability and needless
flucuations in price which (a) give unwarranted "stop" and "go" signals
to production, (b) result in unnecessarily depressed prices to farmers
that do not properly reflect supply and demand conditions, and (c)
jeopardize the quality of the milk and the dependability of its supply.
The objectives of Federal orders are attained by bolstering market
conditions with a legal framework of rules and procedures on which
orderly marketing activities can be based to the benefit of all parties
concerned. These rules and procedures serve to (a) give farmers, milk
handlers and the public an active voice in determining minimum farm milk
prices through a procedure of public hearings, (b) equalize ingredient
cost of milk to handlers through the use of classified pricing, (c)
establish minimum blend prices that assure farmers as much for their

0.
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milk as general supply and demand conditions in the market warrant, and
assure the market of adequate supplies of milk, (c) provide for the
orderly marketing of surplus milk through marketwide pooling and a
pricing method by which farmers are assured uniform prices for the milk
they deliver to individual handlers in the market, (d) reduce the danger
of unwarranted and harmful fluctuations of prices paid to farmers, (e)
assure farmers of accurate weights, tests, classification and accounting
for milk, and (f) make available information on the handling of milk in
the marketing area so as to enable interested parties to evaluate the
market situation.
Federal milk orders do not control milk production, restrict the
volume of milk marketed, or fix consumer prices.

Nor does the USDA

unilaterally impose Federal milk orders on the dairy industry.

Dairy

farmers must initiate request for an order, develop proposed provisions,
demonstrate .the need for an order at a public hearing, and approve
orders before they become effective, and can direct by referendum their
termination.
~Jhile

most of the IIbenefitsli of Federal milk orders are directed

toward producers and consumers, handlers also benefit to the extent that
sufficient supplies of milk are generated, all competitors pay the same
minimum price for milk according to the way they use it, and orderly
marketing if fostered.
Federal milk orders have now been in operation for more than 40
years.

The economic, regulatory and political environment has changed

significantly since then.

While many have been reasonably satisfied

with the operation of Federal orders, others have not.

Criticism has

increased in recent years, particularly by those outside of the industry.
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This raises the question of whether Federal milk orders are here to
stay, or whether they have outlived their usefulness.

In discussing

these questions, I would like to share with you the views and comments
of three prominant economists in the dairy industry.
Dr. Truman F. Graf, Professor of Agricultural Economics at University
of Wisconsin recently reviewed criticism of Federal milk orders in
testimony before the U.s. House of Representatives Dairy and Poultry
Subcommittee .

Referring to remarks made by speakers at the Consumer

Nutrition Institute Conference, Washington, D.C., December 4-5, 1975, he
summarized the following criticisms [2J:
1. U. S. Sena tor Edward Kennedy: "There ; s somethi ng wrong
with a system that first sets regulated prices artificially high, and
then allows monopolistic cooperatives to extract premiums over and above
those prices. This conference is a starting point for a Congressional
inquiry."
2. Jonathon Rose, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust:
"Federal milk order regulation has preversely contributed to declining
milk consumption by creating a price beyond the financial means of those
who need it most."
3. Tanya Roberts, Public Interest Economic Center: "There do not
seem to be any compelling reasons why Federal milk orders are necessary,
either to stabilize markets, enhance dairy farmer incomes, improve the
bargaining power of farmers, or provide an adequate supply of milk. The
combined effects of milk orders cost consumers millions of dollars."
4. vJilliam Lilly, Council on Wage and Price Stability: "Milk
pricing is an area too important to be left to the people who have been
worki ng on it."
5. John E. Kwoka, Jr., Economist, Federal Trade Commission: "At
least it its current form, Federal regulation of milk markets is one
idea whose time has passed."
In addition to CN! conference criticisms, the U.S. Justice Department Task Group on Antitrust Immunities criticized Federal milk orders
for (a) creating an overproduction of Grade A milk by setting prices too
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high and (b) reducing the consumption of fluid milk and other dairy
products by raising the price of Grade A milk for fluid purposes, and in
conjunction with the price support program, elevating the general price
level for dairy products to consumers.
Graf went on to say that the major criticism of Federal milk orders
appears to be that they have unduly enhanced farm milk prices to the
detriment of consumers and society generally.
he saw no evidence to support this charge.

He then testified that

On the contrary, even with

Federal milk orders, he indicated that dairy farmers are still struggling
to achieve equitable prices in light of their costs.
In defense of his testimony he offered the following evidence:
1.

Dairy farmers in Wisconsin keeping electronic farm records with

50 cow herds and an investment of approximately $300,000, receive less
for their labor and management than manufacturing workers in the U.S.
with zero investment in their jobs, $13,820 compared with $15,575 per
year.
2.

Prices paid by farmers in the U.S. increased 72 percent between

1972 and 1978, compared with an increase in Federal milk order blend
prices of only 67 percent.
3.

The Consumer Price Index for dairy products rose 86 percent

between 1967 and 1978, compared to a 95 percent increase in all prices
to consumers, and an 111 percent increase in the price of food.
4.

Milk prices have been declining rather than increasing relative

to average wage levels.

For example, it took 11 minutes at average

manufacturing wage rates to earn enough to buy a half gallon of milk in
1967, compared to 8.6 minutes today.
5.

Dairy farmers are dropping out of business in record numbers.

Wisconsin had 132,500 dairy herds in 1951 but only 47,000 in 1978 - a
65 percent decrease.

The number of U.S. dairy farms dropped from
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1,100,000 in 1950 to 379,530 in 1978, also a 65 percent decrease.
6.

U.S. milk production has been declining - from 124.2 billion

pounds in 1965 to 121.9 billion pounds in 1978 - a 2 percent drop.
7.

Farmers received only 51 cents of the consumer's dollar for

dairy products, and 55 cents of the consumer's dollar for fluid milk in
1978.

Marketing margins cost the consumer almost as much as the milk

itself.
8.

Farm milk prices were 75 percent of parity for manufacturing as

well as all milk in June 1979, considerably below the minimum of 80
percent of parity specified in current law.
9.

Negotiated premiums over Federal milk order Class I prices have

been going down, not up, in recent years, and averaged 44 cents per
hundredweight in June 1979.

Negotiated premiums over Federal order

minimum prices amounted to an average of $277 per producer shipping to
the Chicago market in 1978.
Dr. Herbert 'L. Forest, Director, Dairy Division, u.S. Department of
Agriculture, remarked at the annual meeting of the National Milk Producers
Federation, San Francisco, California, November 30, 1976, as he spoke on
the future role of Government in milk marketing regulation [3]:
There is no denying that milk marketing conditions today are
vastly different from what they were in the early 1930s when Congress
passed legislation involving the Federal Government in milk marketing.
In fact, conditions are vastly different today from what they were 20
years ago and even 10 years ago.
When the Federal Government first became involved in milk pricing
arrangements:
There were a large number of small producers.
Cooperatives were small and in a very weak position as far as
bargaining with the firms who bought fluid milk and manufactured dairy
products.
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Classified pricing plans, pioneered by cooperatives, were collapsing.
Widespread disorder in milk marketing existed.
Markets for milk and dairy products were depressed.
Price instability threatened the development of dependable supplies
of good quality milk for consumers.
The responsibility of milk procurement was largely that of milk
dealers.
The dairy industry was looked upon as having two separate components - a fluid segment and a manufacturing grade milk. This separation of the industry was reflected in Government programs with milk
orders tied to the fluid segment, and price supports more oriented to
the manufacturing side - although the influence of both overlap.
Today:
Dairy farmers are substantially fewer in number and significantly
larger in size.
Cash receipts from dairying are at a record high.
Forces are at work that eventually will lead to one grade of milk.
The fluid and manufacturing segments are becoming more and more intertwined. They are rapidly dissolving as separate segments.
The structure, role and bargaining strength of cooperatives in most
markets have changed. Large regional cooperatives undertake procurement
operations - including assembly and management of fluid milk supplies,
routing raw milk to distributors as needed and managing reserve supplies.
Cooperati ves have been able to negotiate prices higher than Federal
order minimums.
Changes in the intervening period have not eliminated the essential
cause of market instability in dairying which gave rise to the need for
marketing orders at their inception ....
We haven't got scientists to change a basic characteristic of milk,
its perishability;
We haven't got cows to give as much milk in the fall as in the
spring;
We haven't got people to drink as much milk in the spring as in the
fall;
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We haven't got milk dealers committed not to drop producers in the
spring;
We haven't got trucks to move milk at no expense to cities;
We haven't got producers to share proceeds of the fluid market
voluntarily with their neighbors; and
We haven't got a situation where reserve supplies are handled
equally by all parties in a market.
While the need for Government involvement in milk marketing arrangements still exists, this does not mean that the Government's role
needs to be the same. During the early period of the milk order program,
in fact for many years, the emphasis was on getting prices up and making
them uniform between handlers. Cooperatives accepted order minimum
prices as effective prices. Today, in many markets, the emphasis has
changed from one of Government setting the price to one of undergirding
over-order prices established by cooperatives.
After discussing various alternatives for Government involvement in
milk pricing, Mr. Forest concluded:
If producers want the Federal milk marketing order and dairy price
support programs to continue, they have to expect that Government is
going to set down conditions under which these programs operate. Also,
consumers may influence or "mute" the role Government can play in
programs which establish milk prices. The more Government is requested
to divorce prices from the realities of the marketplace the more basis
consumers have for saying dairy programs are not in the public interest.
Dr. Hugh L. Cook, Professor of Agricultural Economics, University
of Wisconsin-Madison, reviewed "Pricing Under Federal Milk Market Regulation,"
by John E. Kwoka and liThe Social Costs of Federal Regulation of

r~il

k,"

by Richard A. Ippolito and Robert T. Masson, the primary sources for
U.S. Justice Department and other attacks on Federal milk orders [4J. He
infers that the results of these studies which show that Federal milk
orders unduly increase price, reduce consumption, and result in uneconomic
patterns in milk production, are only as valid as their assumptions.
According to Cook, these studies are based on the assumptions that:

".

9

1. In the absence of Federal orders, there would be no attempt at
classified pricing (or pricing according to use);
2. There is no need for milk reserves in Federal order markets;
3. With little or no Class I differentials, adequate supplies for
fluid milk nee9s would be produced at current manufacturing milk prices,
at times and places needed;
4. Processor-distributors would pass on to consumers essentially
all the expected savings in producer pay prices; and
5. There is little net social benefit associated with any increased price and income stability provided by the Federal milk orders.
In reality, these are not very valid assumptions.

Dr. Cook suggests

that before we conjecture what would happen if Federal milk orders were
removed, it is appropriate to re-examine the situation that existed
before the orders were put into effect. He cites the following conditions:
1. There were no audits of dealer reports on receipts and utilization available to producers, to their cooperatives, to other
dealers, nor to state and Federal governments.
2. Dealers almost always sought milk from producers as nearby to
the city as possible. This meant two things;
a. Few distant producers shared Class I sales; and
b. Those who did shared inequitably in Class I sales
and received little reward for carrying the surplus.
3. Some dealers attempted classified pricing but there was little
uniformity as to which milk uses were to receive the highest prices.
Some dealers in the same milk shed paid on a flat price basis. So,
dealers had to compete with each other based on pay prices for milk as
well as on sales prices and consumer services.
4. Increases in dealer prices to producers were · always fully
passed on to consumers; decreases mayor may not have been passed on.
Dealer margins were protected.
5. When producer associations were formed in the various major
sheds in the United States, notably the northeastern sheds, Chicago, and
some of those on the west coast, the only way these associatipns had to
enforce their prices was by milk strikes, which meant that consumers
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were entirely or largely without milk for several days until producer
associations won or the strike was broken by dealers and nonmembers.
The record of these associations was very unstable as to their increases
in prices to producers and the services they were able to furnish to the
milk shed.
Dr. Cook advises that:
The removal of the Federal order system would put further pressure
on the dealers in that they would have to concern themselves with the
price they pay farmers for milk (without knowing what the competition
pays), as well as competing for resale accounts. So far as dealers pay
prices are concerned, the situation might return to where it was in
1937, in that some would attempt classified pricing and some in the same
market area might pay on a flat price basis. Again there might be no
uniformity as to what milk uses were to receive the highest prices. Much
of this might depend on the relative strength of the cooperatives.
However, with no producer settlement fund from which to draw, the
problem of equitable sharing of the surplus burden would be sure to
emerge. Many dealers could not pay the blend price, and indeed many
cooperatives now classified as handlers could not pay the blend, if they
had low Class I utilization. Handlers, therefore, would seek milk from
producers as near to the city as possible. All this might add up to
some redistribution of returns among producers and lower and less stable
producer prices, and generally less bargaining power by dairy farmers.
What the effect might be on total milk production, on Grade A surpluses,
and on prices paid by consumers is open to speculation.
In conclusion, let me return to the question of whether Federal
milk orders are here to stay, or whether they have outlived their usefulness.
It is my opinion that as long as the consuming public continues to
demand and drink fresh milk marketed in fluid form, in order to assure
adequate supplies, equitable pricing and orderly marketing, there will
continue to be a need to:
1.

Pay a differential for milk used for fluid to obtain an adequate

supply at the times and places demanded .
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2.

Carry reserve supplies of fluid milk.

3.

Equitably share the proceeds from the fluid differential among

producers and the cost of handling reserve supplies among handlers.
This is largely being done now through the classified pricing,
pooling, and blend pricing provisions of Federal (and state) milk orders,
and service charges assessed by cooperatives.
Federal milk orders, which can cover multi-state marketing areas
where needs be, will probably continue to be the most efficient way to
perform most of these necessary functions.

They can be expected to

change in the future as economic and political conditions change.
Should Federal orders fall into public disfavor in the wake of widespread
public sentiment for Government deregulation, however, there is a
possibility that dairy cooperatives, which have increased considerably
in size and bargaining power in recent years, could perform them, at
least in some areas of the country.

In some situations responsible

handlers might also successfully perform them to the extent that they
operated their own audited classified pricing plan and individual handler
pool and together with their producers, provided and handled their own
milk reserves.
Should critics prevail to the extent that public disfavor falls
upon both Federal milk orders and cooperatives so much so that neither
is able to operate classified pricing, pooling and blend pricing programs
for lack of either legal sanction or competitive ability, in some markets
we may have to relearn from experience the lessons of the past 40 years
concerning the unique characteristics of fluid milk which have led to
the marketing institutions, laws and programs that exist today.

•

,.
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